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I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of the cases decided during the Survey year did not
establish new principles of administrative law. Instead, the deci-
sions clarified and expanded principles already established by the
existing case law. This article will highlight and discuss the most
important decisions handed down by Illinois courts during the
Survey period.
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II. CASE LAW
A. Procedural Case Law
1. The Role of an Administrative Agency
In Donnelly v. Edgar,' the Illinois Supreme Court examined an
administrative agency's role in reviewing the findings and recom-
mendations of its hearing officers. The court held that the final
decision of whether to grant restricted driving permits rests with
the Secretary of State ("the Secretary") or his designee.' More-
over, the court concluded that the Secretary's decision regarding
restrictive driving permits need not be circulated to give parties
adversely effected an opportunity to present exceptions.
In Donnelly, the plaintiff was convicted of operating a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of alcohol.4 Subsequently, the plain-
tiff applied for a restricted driving permit.5 After a hearing, the
Secretary adopted the hearing officer's findings, conclusions, and
recommendations and refused to issue a restricted driving permit.6
The plaintiff brought an administrative review action contending
that the Secretary failed to comply with the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act ("the Act")' by not permitting him to present ex-
ceptions to the proposed decision.8 The circuit court reversed the
Secretary's decision and ordered the Secretary to issue the plaintiff
a restricted driving permit.9 The court premised its decision upon
the Secretary's failure to circulate his proposed decision for review
and comment as required by section 1013 of the Act.'0 In revers-
ing the lower court, the Illinois Supreme Court held section 101311
1. 117 Il1. 2d 59, 509 N.E.2d 1015 (1987).
2. Id. at 67, 509 N.E.2d at 1018.
3. Id. at 66, 509 N.E.2d at 1018.
4. Id. at 61, 509 N.E.2d at 1016.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 61-62, 509 N.E.2d at 1016.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, paras. 1001-1021 (1985).
8. Donnelly, 117 I1. 2d at 62, 509 N.E.2d at 1016.
9. Id.
10. Id. Section 1013 provides:
Except where otherwise expressly provided by law, when in a contested case a
majority of the officials of the agency who are to render the final decision has
not heard the case or read the record, the decision, if adverse to a party to the
proceeding other than the agency, shall not be made until a proposal for deci-
sion is served upon the parties, and an opportunity is afforded to each party
adversely affected to file exceptions and to present a brief and, if the agency so
permits, oral argument, to the agency officials who are to render the decision.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 1013 (1985).
11. ILL. REV STAT. ch. 127, para. 1013 (1985).
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of the Act inapplicable to the case at issue.' 2 The court reasoned
that a proposed decision need only be circulated if the decision is to
be made by multiple decision makers. 13 Hence, because the Secre-
tary or his designee renders the final decision, section 1013 does
not apply.' 4
In cases of restricted driving permits, Donnelly permits the Sec-
retary of State or his designee to make the final decision without
hearing the evidence in person provided that he has reviewed the
findings, conclusions, and impressions of conflicting testimony
communicated by the hearing officer. 5 Donnelly, however, should
be construed carefully. The court stressed that "due process is
flexible, and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."' 6 The vast number of restrictive driving per-
mit applications influenced the court's decision in this case. 7 The
court reasoned that an undue burden would be placed upon the
Secretary if it required each adverse decision to be circulated for
comment.' Therefore, the court left open the possibility that
other decisions made by a single decision maker could be subject to
section 1013.
2. The Subpoena Power for an Administrative Investigation
The Illinois Supreme Court questioned the subpoena power of
the Illinois Attorney General in People v. McWhorter.9 In Mc-
Whorter, the court held unconstitutional a subpoena issued by the
Attorney General pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act.2
In McWhorter, pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
12. Donnelly, 117 III. 2d at 66, 509 N.E.2d at 1018.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Secretary's internal policy provided that all formal orders and recom-
mendations are subject to review by a Formal Hearing Review Board. This provision
prompted the circuit court's decision that multiple decision makers were involved. Id. at
63-64, 509 N.E.2d at 1017. The Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the Secretary's inter-
nal policy that "clearly states that the Secretary or his designee makes the final decision
in these matters." Id. at 64, 509 N.E.2d at 1017.
15. Id. at 67, 509 N.E.2d at 1018.
16. Id. (citing Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs, 84 Ii. 2d 42,
51, 416 N.E.2d 1082, 1087 (1981)).
17. Id. at 66, 509 N.E.2d at 1018. The court commented on the burden on the Secre-
tary and the long delays that would be created for applicants if parties had to be allowed
to make oral arguments, submit a brief, and file exceptions to a proposed decision. Id.
18. Id.
19. 113 Ill. 2d 374, 498 N.E.2d 1154 (1986).
20. Id. at 384, 498 N.E.2d at 1158.
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Deceptive Business Practices Act ("the Act"), 2 the Attorney Gen-
eral issued a subpoena to the owner of a dog kennel. 2 Compliance
with the subpoena required the kennel owner to travel to the
Springfield office of the Attorney General.23 The round trip dis-
tance from the kennel owner's place of business to Springfield was
approximately three hundred and fifty miles. 4 The McWhorter
court held that in light of this distance, the subpoena was arbitrary
and oppressive and, therefore, an unconstitutional application of
the Act. 25 The Court commented that a less disruptive method
which would not have imposed such an inconvenience could have
been chosen.26
It is important to note that Mc Whorter has limited application.
In McWhorter, the Attorney General issued a subpoena in re-
sponse to a single consumer's complaint regarding a lost deposit.27
The court hinted that the subpoena may have been reasonable if
the Attorney General had specific evidence of consumer fraud or if
the case involved a substantial sum of money. 8
3. Alleged Bias of a Board Member
The Illinois Supreme Court in Collura v. Board of Police Com-
missioners29 addressed the alleged bias of a board member who
viewed inadmissible polygraph exam results. The court held that
the board member need not recuse herself simply because she had
viewed inadmissible evidence at a prior hearing. 0
In Collura, the Itasca Board of Police Commissioners ("the
Board") discharged a police officer for sexual misconduct. 31 The
police officer brought an administrative review action and alleged
that the Board viewed inadmissible polygraph results. 32 The cir-
cuit and appellate courts affirmed the Board's decision discharging
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 261-272. (1985). The Act grants the Attorney
General broad investigatory powers including the power to subpoena documents. Id.
22. McWhorter, 113 I11. 2d at 376, 498 N.E.2d at 1155.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 383, 498 N.E.2d at 1158.
25. Id. at 384, 498 N.E.2d at 1158.
26. Id. at 382-83, 498 N.E.2d at 1158.
27. Id. at 381-82, 498 N.E.2d at 1157.
28. The court emphasized that the Attorney General issued the subpoena solely on
the basis of a single consumer complaint which merely sought the return of a deposit
placed on a dog. Id. at 381-84, 498 N.E.2d at 1155-58.
29. 113 III. 2d 361, 498 N.E.2d 1148 (1986).
30. Id. at 371-72, 498 N.E.2d at 1152-53.
31. Id. at 364, 498 N.E.2d at 1149.
32. Id. at 368-69, 498 N.E.2d at 1151.
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the police officer. 33 The Illinois Supreme Court held that poly-
graph results were inadmissible and remanded the matter to the
Board.3 4 On remand, the Board concluded that the evidence, ab-
sent the inadmissable polygraph results, supported the discharge."
Thus, the Board reinstated the police officer's discharge.36
The police officer subsequently filed a second action for adminis-
trative review.37 The officer contended that the Board denied him
due process because a Board member viewed the inadmissable
polygraph results at the prior hearing. 38 The lower courts found
no bias and again affirmed the police officer's discharge.3 9
The Illinois Supreme Court in Collura began its rationale with
the axiom that board members are presumed to be independent.'
In addition, the court stated that "it has been held that any preju-
dice from a hearing board's being exposed to evidence of a poly-
graph examination is cured by an admonition by the board's
counsel that the evidence should be disregarded. '41  The Collura
court determined that the Board did not disregard its counsel's in-
struction by considering ibe inadmissible polygraph results in
reaching its decision.4 2 Moreover, the court concluded that admin-
istrative review is the proper remedy for bias and not the appoint-
ment of a new board.43 The Collura court, in addition to holding
33. See Kaske v. City of Rockford, 96 Ill. 2d 298, 450 N.E.2d 314 (1983), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 960 (1983). (The circuit and appellate courts found no error in tht admis-
sion of polygraph results at the initial hearing).
34. Id. at 312, 450 N.E.2d at 320. In Kaske, the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated
the actions of Collura v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 97 Il. App. 3d 1199,
426 N.E.2d 1285 (2d Dist. 1981) and Kaske v. City of Rockford, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1203,
427 N.E.2d 1053 (2d Dist. 1981). The court held the polygraph results to be less proba-
tive than prejudicial, and hence inadmissable. Kaske, 96 Ill. 2d at 308, 450 N.E.2d at 319.
35. Collura, 113 Ill. 2d at 368, 498 N.E.2d at 1151.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 364, 498 N.E.2d at 1149.
40. Id. at 370, 498 N.E.2d at 1152. "Without a showing to the contrary, State ad-
ministrators 'are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of
judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.' "Id. (citing
Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs, 84 Ill. 2d 42, 55, 416 N.E.2d
1082, 1089 (1981), (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941))).
41. Collura, 113 11. 2d at 371, 498 N.E.2d at 1152. (citing Diamond v. Board of Fire
& Police Commissioner, 115 Il. App. 3d 437, 450 N.E.2d 879 (1st Dist. 1983)) (held a
denial of due process because board members were not given an admonition to disregard
inadmissable polygraph results).
42. Id. at 371, 498 N.E.2d at 1152-53.
43. Id. at 372, 498 N.E.2d at 1153. Furthermore, the substitution of administrative
tribunals for administrative proceedings is rare. Id. (citing Federal Trade Commission v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701-03 (1948)).
1988]
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that the board member need not recuse herself, held the Board's
decision not to be against the manifest weight of the evidence."
4. The Scope of an Agency's Jurisdiction
The Illinois Supreme Court in Kane County v. Carlson45 ex-
amined the scope of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act ("the
Act").46 The court construed the Act broadly and held that it ap-
plied to the Chief Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit as an
employer.47
The court noted that the Act provides a comprehensive scheme
of collective bargaining for public employees and employers subject
to the Act.48 Two labor boards are vested with the responsibility of
administering the Act.49 The Act contains a provision that enables
labor unions to petition to represent governmental employees.50
Under the Act, the boards determine appropriate bargaining units,
to conduct representation elections, and to investigate, hear, and
determine charges of unfair labor practices.5 1 Once the board cer-
tifies an exclusive bargaining representative, the employer is re-
quired to bargain collectively with that representative.5 2
The supreme court granted the Chief Judge of the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit leave to file a writ of mandamus.5 3 The Chief
44. Id. at 372-73, 498 N.E.2d at 1153-54. The Illinois Supreme Court, in its analysis,
reiterated the well-established axiom of administrative review; findings of fact made by an
administrative agency are considered to be "prima facie true and correct." Id. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-110 (1985); Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 42 Ill. 2d 13, 244 N.E.2d 598 (1969). A court on administrative review should
not reweigh the evidence but should limit its inquiry to ascertaining whether the findings
and decision of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Collura, 113
Ill. 2d at 372-73, 498 N.E.2d at 1153 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment
Practices Commission., 86 I1. 2d 60, 426 N.E.2d 877 (1981); Davern v. Civil Service
Commission, 47 Ill. 2d 469, 269 N.E.2d 713 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971)).
45. 116 Ill. 2d 186, 507 N.E.2d 482 (1987).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-1627 (1985).
47. Carlson, 116 Il. 2d at 216, 507 N.E.2d at 494.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1605(a), (b) (1985).
49. Id. These sections create a local board that has jurisdiction over collective bar-
gaining matters involving "units of local government" with a population in excess of one
million persons, and a state board having jurisdiction over other public employers within
the meaning of the Act. Id.
50. Id. at paras. 1609, 1611.
51. Id.
52. Id. at para. 1609.
53. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d at 195, 507 N.E.2d at 484. The Illinois Supreme Court con-
solidated two actions in Carlson. In the first action, the County of Kane challenged the
Act's scope and argued that the Act was unconstitutional. The court never reached the
merits of the County's challenge and held that the County lacked standing. Id. at 201,
507 N.E.2d at 487.
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Judge sought to bar the board from proceeding on certain unfair
labor complaints against him regarding his employment of proba-
tion officers.5 A hearing officer of the board ordered the Chief
Judge to sign a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the
Act." The Chief Judge contended that the Act did not apply to
the judiciary as an employer of the probation officers. He also ar-
gued that the Act was unconstitutional.5 6
The Carlson court liberally construed the Act's scope and found
the terms "State of Illinois" and "persons acting on its behalf"
sufficiently broad to include the Chief Judge as a public employer
under the Act. 57 In addition, the court held that the Act was con-
situtional as applied to the judiciary. a
As the court emphasized, Carlson should not be broadly con-
strued. 9 The court noted that particular problems, including
those of a consitutional nature, are sure to arise as the broad provi-
sions of the Act are applied to the unique workings of the judicial
branch. 6° Thus, the Carlson court identified the two actions as pre-
liminary attempts to gauge the scope of the Act.6'
5. Failure to Join Necessary Parties
The Illinois Supreme Court has not determined whether a fail-
ure to join necessary parties in an administrative review action can
be cured by an amendment to the pleading joining the necessary
parties after the expiration of the thirty-five day requirement of
section 3-103.62 The appellate courts, however, including the Ap-
54. Id. at 195, 507 N.E.2d at 484.
55. Id. at 195-96, 507 N.E.2d at 484-85.
56. Id. at 201, 507 N.E.2d at 487.
57. Id. at 202, 507 N.E.2d at 487. Section 1603 defines a public employer under the
Act as: "the State of Illinois; any political subdivision of the State ... and any person
acting within the scope of his or her authority, express or implied, on behalf of such
entities in dealing with its employees." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1603(o) (1985).
58. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d at 216, 507 N.E.2d at 494. The judge unsuccessfully argued
that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine of the Illinois Constitution by
subjecting the judiciary to executive control. Id. at 204, 507 N.E.2d at 488. In addition,
the Carlson court dismissed the judge's assertion that the Act violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by its exclusion of educational employees from the Act's scope. Id. at 211,
507 N.E.2d at 491-92. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1603(n) (1985).
59. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d at 210, 507 N.E.2d at 491.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Section 3-103 provides in relevant part that "[e]very action to review a final ad-
ministrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of complaint and the issuance of
summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed
was served upon the party affected thereby." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-103 (1985).
1988]
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pellate Court for the Fourth District in Bradshaw v. Barnes,6 3 al-
low a party to cure the defect by amending the pleading after the
expiration of the thirty-five day period.64
The Administrative Review Act requires that "all persons, other
than the plaintiff, who were parties of record ... shall be made
defendants. '65 In Bradshaw, the plaintiff brought an administra-
tive review action challenging an Illinois Department of Employ-
ment Security Board's ("the Board") decision denying him
unemployment benefits. 66 The plaintiff named the Board's chair-
man as a defendant, but failed to name the Board's director and his
former employer.67 The circuit court granted the Board's motion
to dismiss for the failure to join necessary parties.68 Furthermore,
the circuit court denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint
to add the necessary parties.69
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed
and permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint.70 It reasoned
that the liberal amendment rules of section 2-616(d) 7I apply to ad-
ministrative review.72 The court also noted, however, that a lack
of diligence may be grounds for a court to deny a party's motion to
amend.73
63. 145 Ill. App. 3d 866, 496 N.E.2d 276 (4th Dist. 1986).
64. Id. at 873, 496 N.E.2d at 281. For other cases allowing amendments to cure a
failure to join necessary parties after the expiration of the thirty-five day period, see Mas-
soud v. Board of Education, 97 Ill. App. 3d 65, 422 N.E.2d 236 (3d Dist. 1981); Norris v.
City of Aurora, 64 Il1. App. 3d 748, 381 N.E.2d 996 (2d Dist. 1978); Springfield-Sanga-
mon County Regional Plan Commission v. Fair Employment Practices Commission, 45
Ill. App. 3d 116, 359 N.E.2d 174 (4th Dist. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 71 111. 2d 61,
373 N.E.2d 1307 (1978); Dendor v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 11 IIll. App.
3d 582, 297 N.E.2d 316 (1st Dist. 1973).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-107 (1985). The joinder of all necessary parties
is a prerequisite for the circuit court to conduct an administrative review. Cuny v. An-
nunzio, 411111. 613, 104 N.E.2d 780 (1952); Department of Communications v. Secretary
of State Merit Commission., 131 I1. App. 3d 877, 476 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist. 1985).
66. Bradshaw, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 868, 496 N.E.2d at 277.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 868, 496 N.E.2d at 278.
70. Id. at 873, 496 N.E.2d at 281.
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(a) (1985) provides in pertinent part: "[a]t
any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable
terms, introducing any party who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant,.
72. Bradshaw, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 496 N.E.2d at 280.
73. Id. at 872-73, 496 N.E.2d at 280. The court concluded that diligence is one factor
to be considered when deciding whether an amendment is "just and reasonable" under
section 2-616. Id. See also supra note 71.
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6. Forum Non Conveniens in Administrative Review
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District in Lefton Iron
& Metal Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission 14 considered
venue transfers in administrative review. The Lefton court held
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not applicable to ad-
ministrative review.75
In Lefton, the plaintiff filed an action for administrative review
in the circuit court of Cook County.76 One of the defendants filed
a motion to change venue from Cook County to Sangamon
County." The circuit court granted the motion to transfer venue
based upon forum non conveniens.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the appellate court noted
that the factors that caused the Illinois Supreme Court in Torres v.
Walsh 79 to sanction intrastate transfers based upon forum non con-
veniens are not present during administrative review.80 The court
stressed that in administrative review, the circuit court acts as a
reviewing court and merely reviews the record before it.81 The
court noted that juries are not present during administrative review
and, thus, there is no need to discourage the parties from compet-
ing for a favorable jury.82 In addition, access to proof is not a
problem during administrative review because the record is avail-
able to each party. 3
7. Direct Administrative Review to the Appellate Court
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District in Benton Po-
lice Department v. Human Rights Commission 84 and in Hardees v.
Human Rights Commission,85 considered significant procedural is-
sues regarding direct administrative review to the appellate court.
In Benton, the court concluded that the thirty-five day requirement
74. 146 Ill. App. 3d 799, 497 N.E.2d 394 (1st Dist. 1986).
75, Id. at 804, 497 N.E.2d at 398.
76. Id. at 800, 497 N.E.2d at 395.
77, Id. at 800, 497 N.E.2d at 396.
78. Id.
79. 98 Ill. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983). The factors to be considered in deciding
whether a case should be transferred include: the availability of an alternative forum; the
access to sources of proof; the accessibility of witnesses; the relative advantages and ob-
stacles to obtaining a fair trial; and the convenience of the parties. Id. at 351, 456 N.E.2d
at 607.
80. Lefton, 146 II!. App. 3d at 802-03, 497 N.E.2d at 397.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 803, 497 N.E.2d at 397.
83. Id.
84. 147 III. App. 3d 7, 497 N.E.2d 876 (5th Dist. 1986).
85. 155 Ill. App. 3d 173, 507 N.E.2d 1300 (5th Dist. 1987).
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of section 3-10386 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act,
rather than the thirty day appeal period contained in Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 303(a), 87 is the applicable time limitation for
direct administrative review to the appellate court.8
In Benton, a police officer filed a charge with the Illinois Human
Rights Commission ("the Commission") alleging that the City of
Benton discriminated against him based on physical and mental
handicaps.8 9 The Commission found that the City committed the
alleged discrimination. 90 Thirty-five days after the Commission's
decision, the City filed for direct review by the appellate court. 91
The Commission argued that the City failed to file within the thirty
day requirement of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(3).92
The Benton court held that the City's petition for administrative
review filed on the thirty-fifth day was timely.93 The court con-
cluded that the supreme court intended to defer to the legislature
in setting the time for commencing direct administrative review
actions.94 Therefore, the court held that the thirty-five day period
of section 3-1039s applies to direct administrative review.96
In Hardees, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District
held that the thirty-five day time period for direct administrative
review is not satisfied by the erroneous filing of a complaint in the
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-103 (1985). See also supra note 62 and accompa-
nying text.
87. ILL. S. CT. R. 303(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 303(a) (1985).
88. Benton, 147 Il. App. 3d at 13-14, 497 N.E.2d at 880.
89. Id. at 8, 497 N.E.2d at 877.
90. Id.
91. Id. On January 1, 1986, Public Act 84-717 took effect and amended section 8-111
of the Illinois Human Rights Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 8-111 (Supp. 1986). As a
result, subparagraph 8-111 (a)(3) reads in pertinent part: "[p]roceeding for judicial review
shall be commenced in the appellate court for the district wherein the civil rights viola-
tion ... was committed." Id. at para. 8-Il (a)(3). Other agency decisions that must be
brought under direct administrative review to the appellate court include: Illinois Pollu-
tion Control Board, ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 111 1/2, para. 1041 (1985); Illinois Board of
Elections, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 9-22(1) (1985); Illinois Educational Labor Rela-
tions Board, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1716(a) (1985); The Illinois Public Labor
Relations Board, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1611(e) (1985); Illinois Commerce Com-
mission, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 10-201(a) (1985).
92. Benton, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 9, 497 N.E.2d at 878. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303
provides that "notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30
days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.. ." ILL. S. CT. R. 303(a), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 303(a) (1985).
93. Benton, 147 11. App. 3d at 14, 497 N.E.2d at 881.
94. Id. at 13, 497 N.E.2d at 880.
95. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
96. Benton, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 13-14, 497 N.E.2d at 881.
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circuit cou rt.9 Moreover, the court held that a change of venue
cannot curt, the defect.98
In Hardee.', the Illinois Human Rights Commission issued its
decision on December 16, 1985.99 The plaintiff filed for adminis-
trative review with the circuit court on January 17, 1986.'00 The
Illinois Administrative Review Act, however, required that the ac-
tion be filed in the appellate court.10' The thirty-five day period of
section 3-103' ° 2 expired on January 20, 1987.103 The plaintiff
sought to cure the defect by moving for a change of venue to the
appellate court.104 The Fifth District affirmed the circuit court's
order dismissing the plaintiff's action for his failure to file a timely
petition within the thirty-five days in the appellate court. 0 5
Moreover, the Hardees court applied the new provision of sec-
tion 8-111106 retrospectively, despite the harsh results. 0 7 In addi-
tion, the court denied the transfer on account of venue on two
grounds. 08 First, the court noted that the venue statute contem-
plates only vertical transfers and not horizontal transfers. 1°9 Sec-
ond, the court reasoned that because the plaintiff filed the action in
the circuit court, the court lacked jurisdiction to effectuate a
transfer. "10
Hardees and Benton dictate that the procedural requirements
pertaining to direct review be followed strictly. The complaint
must be filed in the appellate court within thirty-five days from the
date on which the decision is served on the adversely affected
party."' Furthermore, a venue transfer to the appellate court can-
97. Hardees, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 507 N.E.2d at 1305-06.
98. Id. at 179, 507 N.E.2d at 1305.
99. Id. at 175, 507 N.E.2d at 1302.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
103. Hardees, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 175, 507 N.E.2d at 1302.
104. Id. at 176, 507 N.E.2d at 1303.
105. Id. at 180, 507 N.E.2d at 1306. The court relied upon Benton, 147 Ill. App. 3d at
7, 497 N.E.2d at 876, in finding the thirty-five day period of section 3-103 applicable.
Hardees, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 507 N.E.2d at 1305.06.
106. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
107. Hardees, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 177, 507 N.E.2d at 1303. Section 8-111 became
effective January 1, 1986. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued on December 16, 1985.
The court stressed that the plaintiff still had nineteen days in which to file after the
amendment's effective date. Id. By applying the amendment retroactively, the court de-
nied the plaintiff an opportunity to have his case heard on the merits.
108. Id. at 179, 507 N.E.2d at 1304-05.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 179, 507 N.E.2d at 1305.
111. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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not be used to cure an erroneous filing of a complaint in the circuit
court.
B. Substantive Issues
1. Utility Rates
The Illinois Supreme Court in Independent Voters v. Illinois
Commerce Commission 112 and in People ex rel Hartigan v. Illinois
Commerce Commission," 3 considered consumer rights regarding
utility rates. In Independent Voters, the court held that utility cus-
tomers are not entitled to refunds during the pendency of an appeal
for a rate increase that is invalidated subsequently by the courts." 1 4
In Independent Voters, a citizens group ("the Voter's Group")
contested a 1971 Illinois Bell rate increase approved by the Illinois
Commerce Commission."' The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately
invalidated portions of Illinois Bell's rate increase." 16 The issue
concerned whether utility customers should be entitled to a refund
for charges collected from the time the Commission approved the
rate increase until the time the court invalidated the increase.' ' 7
The court rejected the Voter's Group contention that the utility
collected unlawful revenues." 8 The court relied upon Mandel
Brothers, Inc. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Company,"9 and rea-
soned that an award of reparations during the pendency of an ap-
peal would conflict with the Public Utilities Act. 20 The court
concluded that the act provided a built-in mechanism for relief and
that further relief would be contrary to legislative intent.' 2' Fur-
thermore, because the rates collected were in accordance with the
rates approved by the Commission, the utility "received no unlaw-
ful charges of which it should be 'disgorged' under restitution prin-
112. 117 I1. 2d 90, 510 N.E.2d 850 (1987).
113. 117 Ill. 2d 120, 510 N.E.2d 865 (1987).
114. Independent Voters, 117 Il1. 2d at 106, 510 N.E.2d at 858.
115. Id. at 93, 510 N.E.2d at 852.
116. Id. The Commission improperly permitted Illinois Bell to include certain oper-
ating expenses in its 1971 rate order. Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Illinois Com-
merce Commission, 55 I1. 2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364 (1973).
117. Independent Voters, 117 I1. 2d at 94, 510 N.E.2d at 852-53.
118. Id. at 98-99, 510 N.E.2d at 855.
119. 2 I1. 2d 205, 117 N.E.2d 774 (1954).
120. Independent Voters, 117 Il1. 2d at 99, 510 N.E.2d at 855. The Act provides, in
pertinent part: "[t]he pendency of an appeal shall not of itself stay or suspend the opera-
tion of the rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission, but during the pendency
of the appeal the circuit court, or the Supreme Court,.. . in its discretion may stay or
suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the Commission's order.. ." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 10-204(a) (1985).
121. Independent Voters, 117 Il. 2d at 97, 510 N.E.2d at 854.
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ciples."'122  Nevertheless, the court ordered the utility to refund
charges collected subsequent to the court's decision that invali-
dated portions of the rate increase. 123
In People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission, the
Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a Commonwealth Edison rate
increase approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission ("the
Commission") because the utility company failed to meet its bur-
den of proof in demonstrating the reasonableness of its construc-
tion costs. 24 Moreover, consistent with Independent Voters, the
court authorized the utility company to charge the increased rates
until the time the Commission, on remand, set the proper rates.' 25
In Hartigan, Commonwealth Edison requested the Commission
to include in its rate base the costs of constructing a nuclear power
plant.126 The Commission approved a portion of these costs, which
prompted twelve intervenors to file suit in the circuit court seeking
to have the rate increase declared invalid. 127 The lower court held
that the utility failed to comply with the Public Utilities Act' 2 in
conducting its audit, and remanded the matter to the Commission
for new ratemaking proceedings. 29 In addition, the lower court
instructed the Commission to disallow all or part of certain ex-
penses.130 The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave for a direct
122. Id. at 98-99, 507 N.E.2d at 855. The court reasoned that Bell was required by
statute to collect the rate increase and, therefore, Bell was not unjustly enriched. Id.
123. Id. at 105, 510 N.E.2d at 858. The amount to be refunded represents the differ-
ence collected under the original rate order and the amount that would have been col-
lected under the new rate order determined by the Commission on remand for the period
in question. Id.
124. Hartigan, 117 Ill. 2d at 136, 510 N.E.2d at 871.
125. Id. at 148, 510 N.E.2d at 877.
126. Id. at 127-28, 510 N.E.2d at 867-68.
127. Id. at 128-29, 510 N.E.2d at 867.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 9-213 (1985). It is important to note that the
Hartigan court refers to section 30.1 of the Public Utilities Act in the 1985 Supplement,
but section 30.1 was renumbered to section 9-213 in the 1985 Illinois Revised Statutes.
Id.
129. Hartigan, 117 I11. 2d at 127, 510 N.E.2d at 867.
130. Id. at 129-30, 510 N.E.2d at 868-69. The circuit court found that the Commis-
sion had placed improperly the burden of showing reasonableness on the intervenors. In
addition, the court concluded that Edison's audit report did not conform to "generally
accepted auditing standards" as required pursuant to section 9-213 of the Public Utilities
Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 9-213 (1985). Consequently, the court disallowed
the costs associated with the delay in obtaining an operating license for Byron I and
ordered the Commission to exclude a portion of the common plant costs of Byron 1 and
2. The nuclear power plants at issue are commonly referred to as Byron 1 and 2. Finally,
the court held that none of the construction costs of Byron 1 could be included in the rate
base. Hartigan, 117 Il1. 2d at 130, 510 N.E.2d at 868-69.
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appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b). 131
As the Hartigan court noted, the Public Utilities Act provides a
comprehensive scheme for determining whether the costs of newly
constructed power plants can be included in a utility company's
rate base.13 2 The Hartigan court agreed with the circuit court and
held that the Commission improperly allocated the burden of
proof. 133 Instead of requiring the utility to demonstrate the reason-
ableness of its construction costs, the Commission improperly
placed the burden of proof upon the intervenors.1 34 The court
stressed the fact that the Commission must take an active role as
an investigator and regulator of the utilities; it may not rely upon
intervening parties to contest rate increases.1 3 In addition, the
Public Utility Act dictates that the utility make an affirmative
showing of reasonableness to instill a sense of confidence in con-
sumers who are required to pay for the rate increase.136
Further, the court held that the utility failed to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the construction costs and that the audit failed to
conform to generally accepted auditing standards.13 7 For these
reasons, the court remanded the case to the Commission for fur-
ther ratemaking proceedings consistent with the opinion.13
The Hartigan court defined the judiciary's role when reviewing
131. Hartigan, 117 Il1. 2d 127, 510 N.E.2d at 867. Illinois Supreme Court rule 302(b)
provides in part: "[a]fter the filing of the notice of appeal to the Appellate Court in a case
in which the public interest requires prompt adjudication by the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court or a justice thereof may order that the appeal be taken directly to it."
ILL. S. CT. R. 302(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 302(b) (1985).
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 9-213 (1985). The Act provides, in relevant
part, that "the cost of new electric utility generating plants and significant additions to
electric utility generating plants shall not be included in the rate base of any utility unless
such cost is reasonable." Id. The Act also requires that the utility conduct an audit to
determine reasonableness. Id.
133. Hartigan, 117 Ill. 2d at 136, 510 N.E.2d at 870. Hartigan rejected the historic
presumption of reasonableness. See City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission,
133 Ill. App. 3d 435, 478 N.E.2d 1369 (1st Dist. 1985). The court concluded that when
the Illinois legislature enacted section 30.1 (now section 9-213) and required reasonable-
ness to be shown through an independent audit, it rejected the historical presumption of
reasonableness. Hartigan, 117 Ill. 2d at 136, 510 N.E.2d at 870.
134. Hartigan, 117 Ill. 2d at 135-36, 510 N.E.2d at 871. The court stressed that the
burden of reasonableness is significant. Id. The court noted that any participation by
groups or person in rate making proceedings before the Commission is strictly voluntary.
It is possible that no party will seek to intervene, or that those parties who do intervene
will lack the financial resources to challenge the reasonableness. Id.
135. Id. at 135, 510 N.E.2d at 871.
136. Id. at 133, 510 N.E.2d at 870.
137. Id. at 147, 510 N.E.2d at 876-77.
138. Id. at 149, 510 N.E.2d at 877.
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the Commission's findings.' 39 Ratemaking is a legislative function
and courts generally are limited to ascertaining whether the Com-
mission's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence.140 Courts may not set new rates. Instead, courts have three
options: they can affirm the Commission's order, reverse the order,
or remand the case to the Commission to receive new or additional
evidence. 141 Lastly, the court held that the utility could continue
to charge the rate approved by the Commission subject to repara-
tions consistent with Independent Voters of Illinois. 42
2. Pollution and Hazardous Waste
The Illinois Supreme Court decided two cases involving pollu-
tion and hazardous waste. In Environmental Protection Agency v.
Pollution Control Board,143 the court ruled on the applicable stan-
dard of review for an Illinois Pollution Control Board's ("the
Board") decision reviewing the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency's ("the IEPA") determination of grants for hazardous
waste permits.44 The court held that the Board was not bound to
apply the manifest weight of the evidence test to the IEPA's
decision. 45
Waste Management Incorporated ("WMI") applied to the
IEPA for hazardous waste operating permits. 46 WMI sought to
open a new hazardous-waste-disposal trench at an existing site.147
In addition, WMI applied for five hundred and ninety-nine supple-
mental permits to dispose of certain hazardous-waste products. 48
The IEPA denied each of these applications and WMI appealed its
decision to the Board. 49 The Board reversed the IEPA's decision
and granted the permits. 50 The IEPA appealed the Board's deci-
139. Id. at 141-42, 510 N.E.2d at 874.
140. Id. at 142, 510 N.E.2d at 874. For a discussion of the manifest weight test, see
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
141. Hartigan, 117 111. 2d at 142, 510 N.E.2d at 874.
142. Id. at 148, 510 N.E.2d at 877. See also supra notes 114-23 and accompanying
text.
143. 115 Il1. 2d 65, 503 N.E.2d 343 (1986).
144. Id. at 67, 503 N.E.2d at 344.
145. Id. at 70, 503 N.E.2d at 345. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
146. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 Ill. 2d at 67, 503 N.E.2d at 344.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Section 1040 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act vests the Board
with the authority to review decisions of the Agency. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para.
1040 (1985).
150. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 Il. 2d at 67, 503 N.E.2d at 344.
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sion directly to the appellate court. 151 The IEPA asserted that the
Board erred by failing to apply the manifest weight of the evidence
test to the IEPA's decision denying the permits.- 2 The appellate
court affirmed the Board's decision. 53
The court recognized that the Board's principal function is to
adopt regulations setting forth the requirements of the permit sys-
tem.' 4 Subsequently, the IEPA must determine whether specific
applicants have satisfied the requirements delineated by the
Board. 55 The IEPA maintained that by not applying the manifest
weight of the evidence test, the Board undermined its authority by
assuming permit-granting authority. 56
The court found one statutory exception to the Board's quasi-
legislative role. 157 This exception applies when the IEPA denies a
permit. 58 The IEPA's decision fits squarely within this excep-
tion.'59 Thus, the court reasoned that the Board was justified in
determining whether a permit should be granted. 6°
The court rejected the IEPA's argument that the manifest
weight of the evidence test applied principally because the Act does
not require the IEPA to conduct hearings.' 6' Hence, none of the
due process procedural safeguards, such as cross-examination, are
afforded, and the applicant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the IEPA relied. 62 Therefore, the Board was
not limited to the manifest weight of the evidence test. 63
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's deci-
151. Id. The Act allows the Agency to appeal the Board's decision directly to the
appellate court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1041(a) (1985).
152. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 Ill. 2d at 67, 503 N.E.2d at 344. For a
discussion of the manifest weight of the evidence test, see supra note 44 and accompany-
ing text.
153. Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board, 138 I11. App. 3d
550, 486 N.E.2d 293 (3d Dist. 1985).
154. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1005(b), 1039 (1985).
155. Id. at para. 1039.
156. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 I11. 2d at 67, 503 N.E.2d at 344.
157. Id. at 69, 503 N.E.2d at 344.
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1005(d), 1040 (1985).
159. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 Ill. 2d at 69, 503 N.E.2d at 345.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 70, 503 N.E.2d at 345. Consequently, the procedural safeguards of due
process are missing. The agency cited cases pertaining to local governing bodies' deci-
sions regarding the approval or rejection of site locations. That part of the Act, however,
requires the local governing bodies to conduct public hearings that must be transcribed,
thereby providing a record for the Board to review. Id. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111
1/2, paras. 1039.2, 1040.1 (1985).
162. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 Ill. 2d at 69, 503 N.E.2d at 345.
163. Id. at 70, 503 N.E.2d at 345.
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sion. "' The court noted the Board's finding that the "the prepon-
derance of professional testimony, especially by those who
conducted independent studies, indicate[d] that the site's charac-
teristics [were] not such that it [was] inherently unmanageable
"165
In Central Illinois Public Service Company v. Pollution Control
Board, 66 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Pollu-
tion Control Board ("the Board") is not required to promulgate
standards and procedures as a prerequisite for considering a peti-
tion for site-specific standards.167 In 1968, Central Illinois Public
Service Company ("CIPS") constructed a pond on the site of its
power station to collect plant waste. 168 After the storage capacity
of the pond was nearly depleted, CIPS petitioned the Illinois Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (the "Agency") for a permit to con-
struct a second pond. 69 The Agency denied the permit because
the contamination level of the pond exceeded the maximum per-
missible levels. 170  The Board affirmed the Agency's determina-
tion.' 7' CIPS then requested site-specific water-quality standards
which would allow it to exceed the general standards promulgated
by the Board. 172 The Board denied the request. 73 CIPS appealed
the Board's finding directly to the appellate court. 74 The Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that the Board acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the petition without first
adopting standards or procedures. 75  The appellate court re-
manded the matter to the Board to promulgate the necessary stan-
dards and procedures. 76
164. Id. at 71, 503 N.E.2d at 346.
165. Id.
166. 116 Ill. 2d 397, 507 N.E.2d 819 (1987).
167. Id. at 407, 507 N.E.2d at 823. The Board is authorized to adopt regulations of
general applicability in defining the maximum permissible contamination levels in water
supplies. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1027 (1985). In addition, the Board may
provide an adjusted standard for persons who can demonstrate that the adjustment is
consistent with the Environmental Protection Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para.
1028.1 (1985).
168. Central Illinois Public Serv. Co., 116 Il1. 2d at 402, 507 N.E.2d at 821.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. Section 1041(a) of the Act permits direct review to the appellate court. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1041 (a) (1985).
173. Central Illinois Public Serv. Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 142 Ill. App. 3d 43,
491 N.E.2d 176 (4th Dist. 1986).
176. Id.
1988]
Loyola University Law Journal
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held
that promulgating standards and procedures is not a prerequisite
for the Board to consider petitions. "' The court based its rationale
on practical considerations such as the legislative intent of the En-
vironmental Protection Act. 78  Establishing standards and proce-
dures as a prerequisite would require the Board to promulgate
procedures and levels of justification each time a party petitioned
for site-specific regulations. 79 This process would be especially
burdensome considering the different standards that would be re-
quired depending on the character of the land involved.180 More-
over, the court indicated that the legislative history of the Act
suggested the appropriateness of determining the merits of each
case separately.81
Finally, the court considered whether the Board's findings were
arbitrary and capricious. 8 2 CIPS argued that, under the language
of the Act, water pollution cannot occur "unless actual harm to
humans or crops will occur as a result of the contamination...
[and] that there is no pollution if any harmful effects can be
avoided by not using the water."' 1 3 Conversely, the Board inter-
preted the Act to regard water as a resource, and determined that
pollution occurs whenever contamination is likely to render the
water unsuitable.8 4 The Board thus contended that it was not re-
quired to show that actual harm will occur, only that harm would
occur if the contaminated water were to be used.'8 5 The court ac-
cepted the Board's interpretation of the Act and held that the
177. Id. at 407, 507 N.E.2d at 823.
178. Id. at 406-07, 507 N.E.2d at 822-23. The court commented that the legislature
intended to confer additional power upon the Board by permitting it to adopt site-specific
regulations. Id. If the Board were first required to adopt standards and procedures of
justification, its power would be limited, which is contrary to legislative intent. Id.
179. Id. at 404, 507 N.E.2d at 822.
180. Id.
181. Id at 406-07, 507 N.E.2d at 822-23. The Legislature enacted section 28.1 to
provide the Board with streamlined procedures for site-specific regulations. Id.
182. Id. at 412, 507 N.E.2d at 825-26.
183. Id. at 409, 507 N.E.2d at 824. The Act provides that "[water] pollution is such
alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological or radioactive properties of any
waters of the State, or such discharge of any contaminant into any waters of the State, as
will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful or detrimental or
injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agri-
cultural, recreational, or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild animal, birds, fish or
other aquatic life." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003(n) (1985).
184. Central Illinois Public Serm. Co., 116 Ill. 2d at 409, 507 N.E.2d at 824.
185. Id. An agency charged with the administration of an Act, is entitled to defer-
ence to its interpretation of the statute. Id. (citing Masa v. Dept. of Registration & Educ.,
116 I11. 2d 376, 507 N.E.2d 814 (1987); Illinois Consol. Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Commn., 95 Il1. 2d 142, 447 N.E.2d 295 (1983)).
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Board's findings were not arbitrary and capricious. 86
Central Illinois Public Service Company's importance is magni-
fied by the courts's reluctance to interfere with the Board's exper-
tise when the public interest is at stake. The court emphasized that
the Board is much better equipped to determine the dangerous ef-
fects of a pollutant and to balance the public good against the indi-
vidual hardship. 87
3. License Revocations
In Masa v. Department of Registration and Education,'88 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court upheld an Illinois Department of Registration
and Education (the "DRE") decision to revoke a veterinarian's li-
cense for malpractice.189 In Masa, the DRE charged a veterinarian
with committing gross malpractice in performing surgery on a dog
and sought the suspension or revocation of the doctor's license.' 9°
After an administrative hearing, the DRE adopted the Veterinary
Examining Committee's recommendation that the doctor commit-
ted gross malpractice and revoked his license. 191 The doctor then
filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court al-
leging that the DRE's decision was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. 92 Both the circuit and the appellate courts found
that the DRE's finding of gross malpractice was against the mani-
fest weight of the evidence. 193
The Illinois Supreme Court found ample evidence in the record
to sustain the DRE's finding of gross negligence. 94 Two veterinari-
ans testified that the doctor removed a healthy organ from the
dog. 195 This unnecessary removal, coupled with the dog's existing
lung problems, caused the dog's death. 196 Two veterinarians also
testified on behalf of the doctor. 197 Nonetheless, the doctor unsuc-
cessfully asserted that gross negligence is characterized by wilful
186. Id. at 412, 507 N.E.2d at 825-26.
187. Id.
188. 116 IM. 2d 376, 507 N.E.2d 814 (1987).
189. Id. at 388, 507 N.E.2d at 819.
190. Id. at 378-79, 507 N.E.2d at 814-15.
191. Id. at 379, 507 N.E.2d at 815.
192. Id. For a discussion of the manifest weight of the evidence test, see supra note 44
and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 387, 507 N.E.2d at 818.
195. Id. at 381-82, 507 N.E.2d at 815.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 382, 507 N.E.2d at 816.
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and wanton action or recklessness.198 The court concluded that
the DRE was required only to demonstrate great negligence in the
performance of the doctor's veterinary practice. 99 Further, the
court expressed its reluctance to tamper with the DRE's decision
and deferred to its expertise and experience in upholding the revo-
cation of the doctor's license.2co Masa confirms the wide deference
that the Illinois Supreme Court currently is giving to agency deci-
sions. This is particularly evident when the public health or safety
is involved or when a matter requires an agency's technical
expertise.
4. The Right to Housing
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District in Rackow
v. Illinois Human Rights Commission 20' held that a Human Rights
Commission finding that certain apartment owners and its manag-
ers (referred to collectively as the "Owners") violated the Illinois
Human Rights Act ("the Act") by refusing to rent an apartment to
a prospective tenant because the tenant had children.20 2 Further-
more, the court upheld the Act's constitutionality in prohibiting
discriminatory practices in housing facilities against people with
children.0 3
In Rackow, a prospective tenant completed an application to
rent a two bedroom apartment.204 The apartment complex main-
tained a policy whereby no children were permitted to live in the
one bedroom apartment units and only one child could live in its
two bedroom units.2°5 On his application, the tenant indicated his
status as divorced with no children.206 The apartment owner sub-
sequently learned that the tenant was separated and had eight chil-
198. Id. at 387, 507 N.E.2d at 818. The court commented that by enacting the Veter-
inary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act, the State Legislature intended to insure that
only qualified individuals would be able to practice in Illinois. By allowing removal for
only wanton or willful conduct, veterinarians who exhibit a "glaringly obvious deviation
from an acceptable standard of care" would be permitted to practice. Id. This is clearly
contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. Id.
199. Id. at 387, 507 N.E.2d at 819. The court declined to require recklessness. The
court noted that gross negligence is commonly understood to encompass "very gross neg-
ligence, .. . [b]ut it is something less than the willful, wanton and reckless conduct." Id.
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (5th ed. 1979)).
200. Id. at 388, 507 N.E.2d at 819.
201. 152 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 504 N.E.2d 1344 (2d dist. 1987).
202. Id. at 1061, 504 N.E.2d at 1355.
203. Id. at 1060, 504 N.E.2d at 1354.
204. Id. at 1050, 504 N.E.2d at 1347.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1050-51, 504 N.E.2d at 1348.
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dren; but none of the children lived with the tenant.2°7 The
tenant's ex-wife retained custody of the children and the tenant
had visiting rights. 208 The tenant informed the apartment owner
that he might have two or three of the youngest children for a
weekend each month and that occasionally a couple of the children
might stay with him during the summer.2°
At a hearing before the Illinois Human Rights Commission, the
tenant testified that the apartment manager stated that he could
not rent an apartment because children over five years of age were
not permitted in the complex.210 The apartment manager testified
that the denial of the application was based on the tenant's falsifi-
cation of his rental application in which he indicated that he was
divorced and had no children.2 ' Conversely, the owner testified
that the denial occurred because of the aforementioned complex
policy regarding children.2 2
Section 3-104 of the Act2 ' 3 makes it a civil rights violation for an
"owner or agent of any housing accommodation to:" (1) require as
a condition precedent to a rental that the prospective tenant not
have children under the age of fourteen; or (2) have in the lease
agreement a condition which would terminate the lease on account
of a tenant having children under the age of fourteen. 21 4
The Commission found that the complex violated section 3-
1042 15 because its owner refused to rent an apartment to a tenant
who had children.21 6 The owner then filed for administrative re-
217view. ' On administrative review, the owner contended that there
was insufficient evidence to find a civil rights violation.21' The trial
and the appellate courts found no merit to this assertion, especially
in light of the uncontested fact that the complex had an oral policy
under which children were restricted or banned from living in the
complex.21 9
Moreover, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
207. Id. at 1051, 504 N.E.2d at 1348.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1050, 504 N.E.2d at 1347.
210. Id. at 1052, 504 N.E.2d at 1348.
211. Id. at 1053, 504 N.E.2d at 1349.
212. Id.
213. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 3-104 (1985).
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
216. Rackow, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1055, 504 N.E.2d at 1350.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1360, 504 N.E.2d at 1354-55.
219. Id. at 1061, 504 N.E.2d at 1355.
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held that section 3-104220 was consitutional. 22' The court held also
that the statute did not violate the due process clause for vague-
ness.222 The court observed that there is a strong presumption of
constitutionality, and indicated that the burden of proof rests with
the challenging party to demonstrate the invalidity of the stat-
ute.223 Moreover, the court used the rational basis test rather than
strict scrutiny in accessing the statute's constitutionality.224 The
court easily found a rational basis for the statute based upon the
state's interest in preventing discrimination and in promoting the
family unit.225 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the
owners' property interest gave them the right to use the property in
whatever way they saw fit.226 The court commented that the own-
ers failed to show that their property rights outweighed the public
interest in assuring fair and equal housing.227 Hence, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Second District held that the plaintiff vio-
lated section 3-10422s and, more importantly, upheld the Act's con-
stitutionality. It is important to note that the Illinois Supreme
Court has not considered the Act's constitutionality. Rackow,
however, sends a strong message to landlords that Illinois courts
will not tolerate discrimination against children in housing.
III. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois
appellate courts handed down decisions in administrative law that
will have a lasting impact. The supreme court clarified and ex-
panded existing principles of administrative law. In addition, the
court defined the rights of consumers regarding utility rates and
addressed environmental issues.
220. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
221. Rackow, 152 Il1. App. 3d at 1058, 504 N.E.2d at 1352.
222. Id. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if its terms are so indefinite that per-
sons of common intelligence necessarily must guess at it meaning and differ as to its
application. Id. at 1057, 504 N.E.2d at 1352 (citing Fagiano v. Police Bd. of the City of
Chicago, 98 Il1. 2d 277, 282, 456 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1983)).
223. Id. (citing Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 227, 497 N.E.2d 763, 767 (1986)).
224. Id. at 1058, 504 N.E.2d at 1353. A court should subject a statute to strict scru-
tiny when a fundamental consitutional right is at stake, otherwise only rational basis is
required. Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corporation, I111111. 2d 350, 489 N.E.2d 1374
(1986) (held under the rational-basis test, the issue is whether the statute bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest).
225. Rackow, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1059, 504 N.E.2d at 1353.
226. Id. at 1060, 504 N.E.2d at 1354.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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